Tuesday, September 14, 2010

How a cascade of errors led ATF to disaster at Waco. By: Larson, Erik, Time, 0040781X, 7/24/95, Vol. 146, Issue 4

PERHAPS THE HARSHEST CRITIC OF THE ATF'S WACO RAID was the bureau's own master, the Treasury Department. In the raid's aftermath, the department launched an investigation by veteran agents from its other law-enforcement agencies, backed up by independent outside reviewers, including Willie Williams, the Los Angeles chief of police. The result was a 500-page indictment that pulled no punches yet whose details, surprisingly, went largely unreported. The Blue Book, as it is known, portrayed a dark carnival of ATF errors. Among them:
ATF established an undercover house adjacent to the compound and installed eight agents there under the guise of students at Texas State Technical College. But they were too old to be convincing. They carried briefcases and drove cars too new and expensive for students to afford. Raid planners gravely underestimated David Koresh's savvy and suspicion--the review team discovered that Koresh had had checks run on the cars and found that three of the four had no credit liens outstanding.
The raid planners had chosen a direct assault in part because they believed Koresh never left the Branch Davidian compound, and thus could never be isolated from his followers. But Koresh did leave the compound--several times in late 1992 and only weeks before the February 1993 raid. ATF just never knew it. The report blamed this on its "failure to establish an effective intelligence operation."
Faulty intelligence also led ATF to believe the Branch Davidians kept their guns under lock and key in a central location. In fact, the guns were distributed and readily available. Likewise, ATF agents responsible for surveillance reported the compound had no sentries. It did.
Eleven days before the Feb. 28 raid, ATF ended surveillance of the compound. Several of the bureau's tactical planners said they didn't learn of this gap until members of the Treasury review team told them about it.
Raid planners believed only 75 people lived at the compound. In fact, 125 were present on Feb. 28.
ATF's plan relied on catching most of the compound's male members at work in a large pit on the grounds. Yet the highest number ATF ever recorded in the pit at one time was 13.
The raid planners expected armed resistance from only male Branch Davidians, and possibly one woman, a former police officer. The review states, "They [the agents] studiously ignored or discounted evidence that other women might also be prepared for armed resistance."
"The raid commanders did not even arrange to have the telephone number for the compound on the day of the raid," the report says. In the midst of the gun battle, an agent did find the number-jotted on a calendar in the undercover house.
At one point, an ATF agent posing as a United Parcel Service trainee accompanied a UPS driver during a delivery to the compound, but the act failed to be convincing. The truck stopped first at an outlying building, where the ATF agent insisted that the driver ask Koresh's followers to let them use the phone and a bathroom, something that a UPS driver wouldn't ordinarily do. This accomplished, they then moved on to the compound itself to try the same plan again. This time, Koresh and another member, David Jones, met them at the gate. Jones was carrying a roll of toilet paper.
PHOTO (COLOR): As if unaware of its own disastrous role in the Waco tragedy, ATF raised its flag over the charred Mount Carmel compound
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By ERIK LARSON

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